In theory, health care providers may adapt their professional behavior to the financial incentives resulting from their remuneration. Our research question is whether the users of health care services anticipate such behavior from their general practitioner (GP) and, if they do, what consequences such anticipation has on their preferences regarding financial incentives. Our theoretical model explains users' preferences for one or another incentives scheme, disentangling the financial motives (incentives amounts, wealth) from the behavioral ones (perceived GPs' sensitivity to incentives). We empirically test our theoretical predictions using data from a survey that elicits individual preferences for either patient or provider hypothetical incentives in France. The empirical results confirm the theoretical ones: users tend to prefer incentives to patients rather than to GPs when the amount of GP incentives is high, when the amount of patient incentives is low, when they anticipate that their GP's medical decisions are affected by financial incentives or when their wealth is high. Otherwise, they prefer their GP to face financial incentives.
| INTRODUCTION
In theory, health care providers may adapt their professional behavior to the incentives they face because of information asymmetries and agency relationships between providers, insurers and patients. Our research question is whether the users of a health care system anticipate such behavior from their general practitioner (GP). If they do, what are the consequences of such anticipation on their preferences regarding financial incentives in health care?
Health authorities in many countries increasingly use incentives to control rising health care expenditures. They do this by imposing health-care cost sharing on patients (demand-side cost sharing) and/or on health care providers (supply-side cost sharing). Concretely, cost-containment incentives for patients take the form of insurance copayments or deductibles. Costcontainment incentives for health care providers can be linked to their remuneration. Remuneration mechanisms such as capitation, or more generally prospective budgets, incorporate such incentives because health care providers become residual claimants on health care costs when they prescribe or provide treatments.
The existing literature on optimal incentives in health care points to a trade-off between alternative problems. On the one hand, patient incentives are associated with greater financial risk and restricted access to health care. On the other hand, provider incentives are often associated with quality deterioration and selection by the providers of the less expensive patients. 2 This basic trade-off has been nuanced in different ways. 3 Altogether, health economists have established a quite complete set of pros and cons for both types of incentives. However, there is no accurate indication so far as to whether the users of health care services prefer one or another incentives scheme, should they choose one among them. The experience with incentives in health care in the US is a useful example with which to motivate our research question. Most health insurance plans before the 1980s were conventional: insurers reimbursed health care providers for each health service provided (physicians were paid fee-for-service), using patients' copayments and deductibles to provide incentives against excessive utilization of health care services. 4 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, managed care organizations became dominant in the US. Managed care organizations traditionally use a variety of techniques intended to reduce the health care spending, among which financial incentives for health care providers (capitated reimbursement for each patient regardless of costs, for example). The price of insurance was typically lower for patients. Managed care has been heavily criticized in the public arena at the end of the 1990s because of the perceived low quality of health care. As a response to this managed care backlash, state governments have passed the "patients' bills of rights" to restrict the use of provider incentives and other cost-containment techniques. In EU countries, the public sector is traditionally more involved in the organization of the health care system than in the US. In social insurance systems in the EU (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg), fee-for-service arrangements tend to be the predominant payment type in both general practice and specialist care out-of-hospital. The users of the health care system are insured either by the public health insurance or within a regulated private health insurance sector. Insurance coverage has generally been generous in the EU, up until recently. In recent decades, many EU governments have either introduced or increased the levels of patients' copayments to control growing health care spending. Incentives to health care providers are far less widespread in the EU than in the US. Some governments have considered such provider incentives despite the generally active lobbying of physicians against incentives. In France, the Direction générale du Trésor (2008) claims that diversity in providers' payment schemes may be useful to improve the quality of the medical activity.
5 Such a choice of payment system by providers may result in self-selection by both patients and providers according to wealth, health, and quality dimensions; in particular, if some payment systems include provider incentives and others do not.
6
To anticipate the effects of hypothetical new incentives in the health care sector and to avoid any adverse public reaction such as the US-managed care backlash, it is important to gather information about the users' preferences regarding financial incentives. So far, such preferences between patient incentives and provider incentives have not been documented. We observe that, quite rationally, the users of health care services resist increases in copayments while providers resist financial incentives in their remuneration. However, the users' preferences can be ambiguous, should they choose one option between patient and provider incentives. If users of health care services anticipate no relationship between their provider remuneration and behavior, there is no reason for users to prefer patient incentives over provider incentives. Indeed, users would not associate any quality limitation with provider incentives. Roughly speaking, the only individual choice would be between paying a copayment in case of patient incentives and paying nothing in case of provider incentives. Conversely, if users anticipate a limitation in quality due to provider incentives, they may trade off a financial loss from paying a copayment against a quality loss if the providers face incentives.
In this paper, we propose both a theoretical and an empirical analysis of this issue. To explain users' preferences for one or another incentives scheme, it is important to disentangle the financial motives (incentives amounts, wealth) from the behavioral ones (perceived GPs' sensitivity to incentives). The theoretical model identifies potential determinants of the preferences for mutually exclusive incentives arrangements. It establishes the following intuitive relationships between preferences for any incentives scheme and the exogenous variables of the model. In theory, users prefer provider incentives if the amount of provider incentives is low enough, their perceived providers' altruism is high enough, the copayment (in the case of patient incentives) is high enough, and their wealth is low enough. Otherwise, they prefer to face financial incentives themselves. The effect of the health status is ambiguous in theory.
2 See Ellis and McGuire (1990) ; Ellis and McGuire (1993) .
3 See Jelovac (2014) for a summary. 4 See Blakely (1998); Pinkovskiy (2014) . 5 Direction générale du Trésor is the department of the French Ministry of Finance that is in charge of national funds and the financial and economic system. We empirically test our predictions using data from a survey of people's preferences for either patient incentives or provider incentives. Face-to-face interviews were administered to a sample of about 1,000 individuals in the French general population. On top of preferences questions, the questionnaire elicited GP-patient relationship, risk attitudes (both financial and health related), health status and behavior, health insurance arrangements, and socio-economic variables. The survey was administered in December 2011, by CSA, one of the top polling companies in France.
7
The health care system in France is characterized by public health insurance with partial reimbursement of health care expenses. Most individuals top up this partial public insurance with a private voluntary complementary health insurance. French health care providers are paid fee-for-service for out-of-hospital care and some of them (although few GPs) are allowed to balance bill. The French general population is well acquainted with demand-side cost sharing mechanisms because a system of franchise has been introduced in France in 2005. This mechanism imposes a copayment for buying drugs, which cannot be reimbursed by any complementary insurance, unless exempted because of health or social motives. This copayment amounts to 0.5€ per pack of prescription drugs. However, people in France are not familiar with provider incentives because no such mechanism has been used for French physicians until recently.
8 Therefore, a hypothetical simple provider incentives scheme has been devised for the survey, which mirrors the French franchise for buying pharmaceuticals. To elicit preferences, discrete choice questions are asked to respondents, in which they choose between either a "patient's copayment p" for buying a drug or a "GP's copayment m" for prescribing the same drug. The idea of a "GP's copayment" is based on a 1991 reform in the UK. According to this reform, a drug-specific budget has been added to the GPs' revenue for GPs to pay for the drugs they prescribe.
The empirical results confirm the theoretical ones by establishing the following: First, for the levels of copayments that we consider, preferences between patient incentives and GP incentives are mixed-some respondents prefer one, while others prefer the other, and a few are indifferent or do not answer. Furthermore, as predicted by the theoretical model, the amounts of incentives play a central role. Respondents tend to prefer patient incentives to provider incentives when the amount of patient incentives is low enough and the amount of provider incentives is high enough. The role of anticipations appears very clearly as well. Respondents tend to prefer patient incentives over provider incentives when they think that an increase in patients' copayment would not impact patients' health although a providers' copayment would. Our results also suggest that respondents tend to prefer patient incentives when they own real estate, which is a proxy for wealth. Moreover, female respondents and respondents in good health tend to prefer patient incentives than provider incentives.
In policy terms, our analysis also provides a range of incentives amounts for both patients and GPs that leads to mixed preferences within the surveyed population. Pilot experiments have highlighted that any incentives outside the range would lead to almost unanimous preferences: General practitioners' copayment per pack of prescription drug over 6€ and patients' copayment per pack of prescription drug over 2€ would be massively rejected, independently of the respondents' profile.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the theoretical analysis and its results. Section 3 describes the data set. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis and its results. Section 5 concludes.
| THEORETICAL MODEL
We assume that a representative patient wishes to consume the intensity of health care services q D that maximizes his total utility under a budget constraint:
The function V () reflects the utility from health, q is the intensity of health care, and h is the initial health status (a healthy individual has a high h). To be coherent with the empirical analysis, we consider that the intensity of health care is the quantity of prescription drugs and that the health care provider is the general practitioner (GP). The function U () is the utility from the consumption of a composite good z, the price of which is normalized to 1. We assume that V () and U () are strictly increasing in their arguments and concave. We reasonably assume that the marginal utility from health care decreases in the initial health: V qh < 0. The patient's copayment per unit of drug is denoted a, and his income or wealth is denoted I. The quantity of drugs q D that is preferred by the patient solves Equation 1 and is implicitly defined by the first-order condition 2: 7 http://www.csa.eu/en/n752/about-us.aspx 8 GPs in France can earn a financial bonus if they satisfy a series of guidelines, among which one relates to cost-containment: the prescription of generic or less expensive drugs. This bonus scheme was generalized to all GPs in France in January 2012, that is, the month following our survey.
Applying the implicit function theorem to Equation 2, we obtain a quantity of drugs q D that increases with the patient's wealth and decreases in the copayment a and in the health condition h:
We further assume that the representative patient expects his GP to prescribe the quantity of drugs q S that maximizes her own total utility, which only partly coincides with the patient's utility:
The parameter β represents what a patient believes to be the weight of his health in the GP's total utility. It can reflect intrinsic motivation of GPs, sense of professional duty, altruism, concern for reputation, fear of legal trials, etc. In what follows, we only refer to GP's altruism as perceived by a patient, keeping in mind that GP's concern for patient's health can have alternative sources. Given the purpose of this research, there is no need to consider the actual intensity of care decided by the GPs and to know the actual weight β that GPs attach to their patients' health. We are rather interested in how patients perceive their GP's medical decisions, to eventually form their preferences on who should bear financial incentives. Therefore, we are interested in the GPs' altruism as perceived by their patients, rather than in its actual level. Y is her basis revenue; B is a drugs-specific prospective budget while b is the share of the costs associated to the prescription of drugs that is borne by the GP, that is, b is the GP's copayment per unit of drug.
9 Therefore, the quantity of drugs q S that the GP wishes to prescribe maximizes Equation 4, and it satisfies the first-order condition 5:
Applying the implicit function theorem to (5), we obtain that the quantity of drugs q S is increasing in the altruism parameter β, and it is decreasing in the GP's copayment b and in the health status h:
We are actually interested in the perception of a possible link between the GP's behavior and her financial incentives. Therefore, the altruism parameter β that is relevant here is the one perceived by the patient. A high β corresponds to a patient's belief that his GP mostly cares about his health when prescribing drugs, thus ignoring any incentive effect of the copayment b. On the contrary, a low β implies that the patient anticipates a significant relationship between his GP's behavior and remuneration. Formally, the incentive power of b (i.e., the negative effect of b on q s ) becomes weaker as β increases and it tends to be null as β tends to 1:
9 A more general model would consider q as the quantity or intensity of any medical service. It would also explicitly include a fee-for-service payment for the GP.
Denoting this fee f, we would write the GP's total utility as
In this case, the GP is a residual claimant when providing medical services only if b > f. Our model simplifies this approach without any loss of generality. Our parameter b simply replaces the difference b -f in the more general version of the model.
We assume that the short side of the market dominates if there is a divergence between demand q D and supply q S . That is, the GP prescribes the lowest of both quantities. If the GP alone pays a copayment (b > 0 and a = 0), she prescribes a quantity q S that is lower than q D . Conversely, if the patient alone pays a copayment (b = 0 and a > 0), the GP prescribes the quantity q D that is preferred by the patient and it is lower than q S . Considering a negotiation between the GP and the patient as in Ellis and McGuire (1990) , rather than the dominance of the short side of the market, would lead to similar results. The relevant question now is whether the patient prefers either to pay a copayment a and get a quantity of drugs q D or to have his GP pay a copayment b and get the quantity of drugs q S . 10 This is equivalent to signing the difference in patient's utilities between the two scenarios. Therefore, we define the function Δ as follows:
If Δ(I, a, β, b, h) is positive, the patient prefers his GP to pay the copayment b. If it is negative, he prefers to pay a copayment a himself. To be complete, let us add that a patient is indifferent between own copayment a and GP's copayment b if Δ(I, a, β, b, h) = 0. We cannot strictly sign Δ without making further unrealistic assumptions. However, we can analyze the influence of our parameters on this difference in utilities, Δ. Using the relationships 2 and 5 defining q S and q D , respectively, and the comparative statics in Equation 3 and in Equation 6, we totally differentiate
, to obtain the following relationships:
These relationships imply that a patient prefers to pay a copayment himself rather than his GP, when the amount of the GP's copayment that is considered is high enough, the one of the patient's copayment is low enough, the patient has a low perception of his GP's altruism and/or the patient's wealth is high enough. Otherwise, a patient prefers provider incentives. All these relationships are intuitive.
Furthermore, the effect of the health condition on a patient's preferences is ambiguous. Depending on whether the GP's copayment is high or low relative to the patient's copayment, the GP prefers to prescribe a quantity of drugs that is higher or lower relative to the one preferred by the patient if the latter had to pay the copayment. Therefore, we cannot tell how patients' preferences over financial incentives vary with their health. However, using a specific class of functional forms to account for the substitutability between initial health status h and health care intensity q, we obtain a negative relationship between Δ and h: 10 We only consider the choice between mutually exclusive incentives schemes. Our idea is that combining patient incentives and provider incentives would only sum the disadvantages of both incentives schemes without summing their advantages. Indeed, one incentives scheme is sufficient to limit the quantity of health care that is prescribed and consumed when it coincides with the short side of the market.
Therefore, when V(h, q) = V(h + q), the last equality in Equation 9 becomes
. This means that patients in better health tend to prefer own incentives a to GP's incentives b.
The following proposition summarizes the theoretical findings.
Proposition 1. When patient incentives a and GP incentives b are mutually exclusive, a representative user prefers patient incentives a over GP incentives b if -the amount of the GP incentives b is relatively high; -the amount of the patient incentives a is relatively low; -the GP's altruism that is perceived by the representative user is relatively low; -the representative user's wealth is relatively high. Otherwise, the representative user prefers GP incentives b to patient incentives a. The effect of the health status on such preferences is ambiguous.
This theoretical model is a reduced-form model able to disentangle the financial motives from the behavioral ones to explain the users' preferences for one or another incentives scheme. It does not pretend to identify the medically adequate intensity of health care even though it is flexible enough to encompass situations of either overprovided or adequate or underprovided health care. Also, an extension of this model to incorporate uncertainty is straightforward. However, our analysis is performed for given incentives and insurance schemes and adding uncertainty would not qualitatively change the results. Last, the results can easily be expressed in terms of absolute risk aversion but, the empirical analysis in Section 4 does not depict any significant effect of risk aversion, despite the many data collected on risk attitudes.
| DATA
The opinion poll company CSA administered a jointly designed survey in December 2011 in the general population aged 18-60 in France.
11 There were 1,008 respondents. The questionnaire had been tested in focus groups and pilot studies, including monitoring of pilot subjects with debriefing. The questionnaire was administered in face-to-face interviews lasting about three quarters of an hour. The questionnaire has been designed not to influence the respondents in any way but rather to provide them with precise information when necessary.
| The dependent variable
To construct our dependent variable "Prefer a patients' copayment to a GPs' copayment," we use a discrete choice method in the following way. After reminding the respondents of the existence of the patients' copayment, and explaining to them how a GPs' copayment would work, the respondents state their preference between a patients' copayment a (scenario A) and a GPs' copayment b (scenario B). The patients' copayment and the GPs' copayment are mutually exclusive: A positive patients' copayment a associated with a zero GPs' copayment characterizes scenario A while a positive GPs' copayment b associated with a zero patients' copayment characterizes scenario B. The amounts of the patients' copayment a vary between 0.75€ and 2€ in scenario A while the amounts of the GPs' copayment b vary from 2€ to 6€ in scenario B. The discrete choice question is asked 3 times, with varying amounts of a and b. Table 1 illustrates a vignette with a discrete choice between scenario A and scenario B.
The respondents choose whether they prefer scenario A or scenario B, are indifferent between both scenarios, or do not want to answer.
12 Table 2 provides descriptive statistics about the respondents' preferences.
11 http://www.csa.eu/en/n752/about-us.aspx 12 Our model is a discrete choice model, or qualitative choice model, in the sense that it describes, explains, and predicts choices between two discrete alternatives. Our aim is not to elicit a value for a willingness to pay, or to accept compensation for, one or another scenario. The model therefore has no relationship with the so-called choice modeling techniques, which are specifically used to estimate the value of the willingness to pay or to accept through a choice experiment.
Both copayments a and b can take any among four possible amounts in Euros: a ∈ {0.75, 1, 1.5, 2} and b ∈ {2, 3, 4.5, 6}. These amounts are unrelated to the public budget or social security budget, but have been devised using pilot studies and sequential design (Kanninen, 1993) to induce respondents' reactions, that is, primarily for econometric reasons. The sequential design allowed the researchers to update the amounts during survey administration, by waves of 100 interviews. The intention is to avoid falling completely outside of respondents' trade-offs, for example, when most respondents either reject or accept one scenario whatever the amounts quoted in the interview. Pilot experiments have highlighted that any incentives outside the specified range would lead to almost unanimous preferences: GPs' copayment per pack of prescription drug over 6€ would be massively rejected, independently of the respondents' profile and the level of patients' copayment. Also, patients' copayment per pack of prescription drug over 2€ would be massively rejected, independently of the respondents' profile and the level of GPs' copayment. Last, GP's copayment below 2€ would be massively preferred to any level of patients' copayment.
To use the discrete choice method efficiently, we randomly use intermediate values of a (a = 1 or 1.5) and b (b = 3 or 4.5) when asking the respondents' preferences for the first time. Then, to avoid redundant information and to avoid loosing credibility in the interview, the amounts proposed in the second preferences question depend on the answer to the first one. Consider for example a first-time choice between a = 1.5 in scenario A and b = 3 in scenario B and that a respondent states a preference for a = 1.5 in scenario A over b = 3 in scenario B. In this case, we consider that any subsequent choice between a ≤ 1.5 in scenario A and b ≥ 3 in scenario B is redundant because a rational respondent should continue to prefer a ≤ 1.5 in scenario A over b ≥ 3 in scenario B and no useful information would be gathered. Therefore, in the second preferences question, we only present nonredundant choices randomly among the available pairs (a, b) following Table 3 . We impose the same restriction on copayments a and b in the third preferences question unless the limit of possible copayments is reached during the second preferences question. The limit would be a = b = 2 in the example. This is why there are three preferences questions for most respondents (911 out of 1,008 respondents) and only two for the remaining 9.6%. Table 3 illustrates this example.
Such dependence induces a form of endogeneity in the econometric analysis because each amount, presented in the second or third questions, depends on the answer to the previous preferences question. In random utility terms, utility for any alternative (patient or GP copayment) in the first question depends on the stated amounts in this question and on unobservables. The amounts in the second question are based on the answer to the first one. So they implicitly depend on unobservables of the random utility, hence the endogeneity.
We assume that respondents are logically consistent because this is the only case for which we have theoretical predictions. Right after the three preferences-elicitation questions, respondents are asked whether they are satisfied with their answers or want to review them. They are also allowed to express indifferences or to refuse to answer, but they are not prompted to it. We think these 
safeguards allow us to treat the answers as logically consistent. Handling other cases would require the presentation of behavioral or cognitive theories that would be quite beside the point of the present paper. It is also important to consider the possibility that not all respondents are logically inconsistent. Arguably, most respondents are logically consistent, assuming the survey questionnaire is coherent. It is likely that those respondents would consider the repetitions in the survey questionnaire as a poor signal about the seriousness of the survey. This was our main concern for avoiding dominated alternatives in the preferences elicitation questions. It would have been easier to disregard this issue, from design, administration, and econometrics points of view.
| The regressors
Additionally to the preferences questions just described, the questionnaire also contains approximately 70 questions about the following characteristics of the users' profiles: Patient-GP relationship (number of visits, GP's behavior, quality, and duration of the relationship, trust, etc.), risk attitudes (both financial and health related), health status and behavior (subjective health, sport, smoking, vaccines, etc.), health insurance arrangements (private supplementary insurance, gate-keeping GP, etc.), and demographic and socio-economic variables (household characteristics, education, income, real estate, etc.). Most of these questions are inspired by Allonier, Dourgnon, and Rochereau (2008), Arrondel, Masson, and Verger (2005) and Miraldo, Galizzi, and Stavropoulou (2016) . The survey additionally asks questions about the anticipated effects of both patient and GP incentives according to respondents. Tables 4 and 5 offer some descriptive statistics about these anticipations and other important regressors. These descriptive statistics will be commented upon in the econometric results section. According to our theoretical discussion, and especially the one leading to Equation 7, parts 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 of Table 4 indirectly reflects GP's altruism as perceived by the respondents.
| EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

| Empirical strategy
The answers to the discrete choice questions used here are multinomial and multivariate. They are multinomial because respondents have the choice between four possible answers: Either they prefer scenario A, or they prefer scenario B, or they are indifferent between both scenarios, or they do not respond. They are multivariate because the respondents make this discrete choice 3 times. These are therefore referred to as three periods. Ideally, we would use a multinomial multivariate probit model. To our knowledge, such a model has not been implemented so far. Hence, we use a Multivariate Probit model as in Cameron and Quiggin (1994) . We motivate this choice as follows.
We are interested in explaining the choice between scenarios A and B, not the indifference between scenarios A and B or refusing to choose. Therefore, we use dichotomous data rather than multinomial data. We consider two strategies for making the multinomial data dichotomous. Either we drop the data of those who are indifferent between A and B and those who do not answer, or we merge them with the answers of those who prefer B. So, our dichotomous data become either "prefer scenario A" versus "prefer scenario B", or "prefer scenario A" versus "do not prefer scenario A". Similar results between the two strategies would indicate that selection bias is not an issue.
Nonresponses can be motivated by many considerations: cognitive limitations (including introspective limits leading to an inability to decide), ideological opposition to copayment, transient nervous states, etc. The theoretical model could not take them into account as it focuses on economic issues, not psychological or political ones. Apart from these off-model considerations, there is no theoretical case where the preferences could be such that a person prefers a nonresponse. We could conduct a separate analysis on the determinants of nonresponses, with a view to perform a "Heckman-style" analysis. That is, to model the selection bias explicitly through a multivariate equivalent of the inverse Mills ratio. However, such a Heckman model does not appear to exist in the case of multivariate discrete choice models. Furthermore, even if there is a sizable proportion of nonresponses to the third choice question (as reported in Table 2 ), it is unlikely that an explicit treatment of selection (if such a treatment was available) would produce estimates much different from the ones that have been reported because excluding or merging nonresponses lead to similar results. As noted in Section 3, we restrict the possible discrete choices in periods 2 and 3 to nonredundant choices. As a consequence, the amounts that we propose to a respondent in period 2 depends on his answer in period 1, and the discrete choice in period 3 depends on his answers in periods 1 and 2. This dependence between sequential choices and previous answers is a well-known source of endogeneity. To treat endogeneity, we follow the multivariate probit likelihood function developed by Cameron and Quiggin (1994) . Using full information maximum likelihood, the Cameron and Quiggin approach addresses this specific type of endogeneity by modeling it explicitly in the likelihood function, as detailed below. Implementation is achieved using directly the multivariate probit package developed by Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) for Stata. 13 Formally, the econometric specification is as follows: Respondents state their preference between scenarios A and B in the first period. In scenario A, the respondent would pay a copayment a 1 , while in scenario B, the GP pays a copayment b 1 . Define the (latent) random utility model as y
where c t denotes copayment in period t and X denotes the time-invariant individual characteristics. A respondent is asked to compare two utility levels in period 1:
• utility in A with patients' copayment a 1 :y
, and • utility in B with GPs' copayment
It is apparent that, in order to avoid that the X variables drop out of the choice entirely, it must be that they have different coefficients in the two choice situations A(a 1 ) and B(b 1 ). Further, the coefficient of the copayment amount cannot be restricted to be the same in the two choice situations because the two copayments do not have the same nature. Therefore, a respondent answers that he prefers A(a 1 ) to B(b 1 ) if
where δ = δ A − δ B . Preference is written A(a 1 ) ≻ B(b 1 ) and indifferences are ruled out by continuity. Writing z~n(0, σ) = g(z), the probability of the above event is thus 13 An alternative strategy is to consider a dichotomous choice panel model with endogeneity, treating endogeneity by GMM similarly to Arellano and Bond (1991) . However, the method of Cameron and Quiggin (1994) is more straightforward and does not require to define instruments. Moreover, a dichotomous choice panel model would not allow to analyze the coefficients of the regressors that do not vary between periods, which is very restrictive in our case. 
which is similar to the specification used in the valuation literature. This is a conventional probit model but for the fact that there are two amounts of copayments. There is a normalizing restriction that is often taken as σ = 1, which is convenient here as it is also adopted in Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) multivariate probit procedure.
The situation becomes more complex when two consecutive choice questions are asked to the respondents, and the copayments in the second question depend on the answer to the first question. However, this is formally similar to doublebounded contingent valuation as treated by Cameron and Quiggin (1994) , and thus, we follow the same solution. Consider an original choice [A(a 1 ), B(b 1 )] and a follow-up [A(a 2 ), B(b 2 ) ]. There are four cases:
-If A(a 1 ) ≻ B(b 1 ), then either a 2 > a 1 or b 2 < b 1 (or both), and
-If A(a 1 ) ≺ B(b 1 ), then either a 2 < a 1 or b 2 > b 1 (or both), and
Note that the follow-up [A(a 2 ), B(b 2 )] differs depending on the answer to the first question. We write g(z 1 , z 2 ) the Bivariate Normal density where (z 1 , z 2 ) is defined in a manner similar to z, but now we allow a covariance coefficient ρ between the two random variables; the variances of both random variables are normalized to one as in the one-variable case. Following Cameron and Quiggin (1994) , the probabilities associated with the previous event are therefore 14 :
We define l 1 = 1 when A(a 1 ) ≻ B(b 1 ) and zero otherwise and l 2 = 1 when A(a 2 ) ≻ B(b 2 ) and zero otherwise. The likelihood function can then be written using these probabilities as
where the subscript i refers to individual respondents. This essentially corresponds to the likelihood function implemented in Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) multivariate probit procedure.
As noted in Section 3, the third period data have some missing values (less than 10%). Therefore, we run regressions both for the bivariate case (only periods 1 and 2 with 1,008 respondents) and for the trivariate case (all three periods with 911 respondents).
For coherence with our theoretical model, we restrict the coefficients of the model to be identical across periods, except for the coefficients of the amount of copayments a and b. We run an additional regression adding as regressors the answers to the previous-period copayments, when available. That is, period 1 choice is used as additional regressor for period 2 choice, and both choices from periods 1 and 2 are used as additional regressors for period 3 choice. Similar 14 Except that we impose that the coefficients of the X variables remain the same in all choice situations. For ease of exposition, the notation in these probabilities is slightly abusive. To make the answer to question 2 depend on the answer to question 1, it is sufficient to introduce, in the X arguments in all the integral limits, the answer to question 1. Strictly speaking, this will introduce an additional parameter in the answer to question 2 respective to the answer to question 1, so that this series of equations should be rewritten to include this regressor, much the same way as the amounts a and b in question 2 are written. Similarly, the answers to questions 1 and 2 are introduced in the X arguments for question 3. This is done in the econometric code. However, we believe that writing this formally here would lengthen the presentation unnecessarily.
results between both regressions would point to a kind of Granger causality of the copayments (and the individual characteristics X) to the choice between the scenarios A and B. In other words, copayments would add information above and beyond the previous period choice(s) to explain the current period choice, that is, respondents react to changing copayments.
Taking all these considerations into account, we end up presenting four regressions in Table 6 . In both the trivariate regression TRIVmp and the bivariate regression BIVmp, the dichotomous dependent variable is "prefer scenario A" versus "do not prefer scenario A" and the regressors include answers to previous choices when available. In the trivariate regression TRIVm, the dichotomous dependent variable is "prefer scenario A" versus "do not prefer scenario A" and the regressors do not include answers to previous choices. In the trivariate regression TRIVsp, the dichotomous dependent variable is "prefer scenario A" versus "prefer scenario B" and the regressors include answers to previous choices when available.
| Empirical results
The descriptive statistics in Table 2 show a first interesting result: For the levels of copayments a and b that we consider, preferences between patient incentives and GP incentives are mixed. Up to our knowledge, this result has not been reported in the literature so far. It may be an indication that some respondents do anticipate some link between their GP's incentives and medical decisions. Table 6 displays the results of the four regressions related to the discrete choice answers. The four regressions lead to similar results and the estimated coefficients of the copayment amounts are significantly different from zero. In particular, adding answers to previous choices to the set of regressors leads to very significant results without affecting the coefficients and significance of the other regressors. This can be interpreted in a Granger causal sense as mentioned earlier: Respondents are not answering in a repetitive manner because changing the copayment amounts leads to different answers, even accounting for previous periods choices.
As predicted by the theoretical model, the amounts of incentives play a central role. The regressor "Amount a" stands for the amount of patients' copayment while the regressor "Amount b" stands for the amount of providers' copayment, both In both the trivariate regression TRIVmp and the bivariate regression BIVmp, the dichotomous dependent variable is "prefer scenario A" versus "does not prefer scenario A," and the regressors include answers to previous bids when available. In the trivariate regression TRIVm, the dichotomous dependent variable is "prefer scenario A" versus "does not prefer scenario A" and the regressors do not include answers to previous bids. In the trivariate regression TRIVsp, the dichotomous dependent variable is "prefer scenario A" versus "prefer scenario B" and the regressors include answers to previous bids when available.
presented in the discrete choice questions. All four regressions in Table 6 suggest that respondents tend to prefer patient incentives over provider incentives the lower the amount of patient incentives and the higher the amount of provider incentives. The role of anticipations appears very clearly as well. The regressor "Anticipated effect of a" is a dichotomous variable that is constructed as follows: It is equal to 1 when respondents answer either "Certainly" or "Probably" to the question "Do you think that an increase in patients' copayment would impact patients' health?" It is equal to 0 when the answer to this question is either "Probably not" or "Certainly not". The regressor "Anticipated effect of b" is constructed in a similar way, the only difference being the question: "Do you think that a providers' copayment would impact patients' health?" Regressions in Table 6 suggest that respondents tend to prefer patient incentives over provider incentives when they think that an increase in patients' copayment would not impact patients' health while a providers' copayment would. This empirical result about the anticipated effect on health of a providers' copayment parallels our theoretical result on perceived altruism: if the respondent perceives his GP to be very altruistic, he should not expect any effect on the GP's medical decisions (see Equation 7 ) and, thereby, on his health.
The estimates of the regressor that proxies respondents' wealth-"Real estate"-also appears to be significant in most regressions. This dichotomous regressor takes value 1 when the respondent owns no real estate. So, the results in Table 6 suggest that respondents tend to prefer patient incentives when they own real estate. This confirms our theoretical result about the effect of users' wealth.
The coefficient estimates for gender appear significantly different from zero as well. Table 6 suggests the following gender effect: Female respondents tend to prefer patient incentives over provider incentives, conversely to male respondents.
Two regressors related to health status-"Drug consumption" and "Subjective health"-are significant. "Drug consumption" provides information about the quantity of drugs prescribed during the last GP's consultation. "Subjective health" is a dichotomous variable with value 1 when the respondent has not felt hampered because of his health during the last 12 months. The results in Table 6 suggest that respondents in better health tend to prefer patient incentives over provider incentives. This result is in line with the relationship obtained with the example V (h, q) = V (h + q) in Equation 10, even though our general model could not unambiguously conclude on it.
Last, the regressor "Foregoing healthcare" that illustrates whether or not the respondents have foregone the consumption of some prescribed drugs because of financial reasons, is not significant. So is the case for the regressor "Complementary insurance," which provides information about whether or not respondents are privately insured against reimbursable copayments. According to numerous trials not reported here, the data collected about risk attitudes and about relationships with GPs do not help explain the preferences for one or another incentives arrangement.
| CONCLUSION
To anticipate the effects of hypothetical new incentives in the health care sector and to avoid any adverse public reaction such as the US managed care backlash, it is important to gather information about the users' preferences regarding financial incentives. With this purpose in mind, we propose both a theoretical model and an empirical analysis to document the preferences of the users of the health care system between financial incentives to patients and financial incentives to providers. The empirical analysis uses data collected during a survey administered professionally in December 2011. In particular, the survey elicits the respondents' preferences for either provider incentives or patient incentives using a discrete choice model.
The theoretical model establishes that a representative user of health services tend to prefer provider incentives if he perceives that his GP is altruistic enough, the amount of provider incentives is low enough, the copayment (in the alternative of patient incentives) is high enough, and their wealth is low enough. Otherwise, he prefers to face financial incentives himself. The effect of the health status is ambiguous in theory.
The empirical analysis confirms the theoretical results. First, for the levels of copayments that we consider, preferences between patient incentives and GP incentives are mixed. That is, not everyone prefers others, that is, their GP, to pay. Furthermore, as predicted by the theoretical model, the amounts of incentives play a central role. Respondents tend to prefer patient incentives over provider incentives the lower the amount of patient incentives and the higher the amount of provider incentives. The role of anticipations appears very clearly as well. Respondents tend to prefer patient incentives over provider incentives when they think that an increase in patients' copayment would not impact patients' health although a providers' copayment would. Our results also suggest that respondents tend to prefer patient incentives when they own real estate, which is a proxy for wealth. Moreover, female respondents and respondents in good health tend to prefer patient incentives over provider incentives, conversely to male respondents. According to numerous trials not reported here, the data collected about risk attitudes and about relationships with GPs do not help explain the preferences for one or another incentives arrangement.
Both our theoretical and empirical analyses thus explain users' preferences disentangling the financial motives from the behavioral ones. The survey design has restricted the amounts of incentives to a range where they lead to nontrivial preferences. Outside the range, respondents would almost unanimously prefer one or another incentives scheme.
